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The Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle
Financial Responsibility Law of 1990:
Constitutionality of Achieving Affordable
Insurance Rates Through Freeze and
Rollback Measures
I. Introduction
In the wake of the liability insurance crisis of the 1980's,' state
legislatures have been formulating novel attacks on the problem of
skyrocketing insurance rates,2 particularly in the automobile insur-
ance field.' In recent years, motorists have found insurance increas-
ingly unaffordable and frequently unobtainable because of some in-
surers' unwillingness to write new policies in an uncertain market.
These problems have been most acute in larger cities. Philadelphia
has seen a severe escalation of automobile insurance rates,' and
Pennsylvania's average insurance premiums are among the highest
in the country."
Various theories have been advanced to explain the cause of the
"insurance crisis".' Many groups contend the source of the insurance
I. The liability insurance crisis peaked in the mid 1980's. Although this Comment fo-
cuses on automobile insurance, the insurance crisis was even more pronounced in other areas.
Soaring premiums and the growing unavailability of certain types of liability insurance forced
business failures, drowned many municipal activities and services, and threatened many types
of medical programs. See generally Eliot Martin Blake, Comment, Rumors of Crisis: Consid-
ering the Insurance Crisis in an Information Vacuum, 37 EMORY L.J. 401 (1988) [hereinafter
Rumors of Crisis].
2. At least 41 states have passed tort reform legislation since 1980. Philip A. Talmage
& N. Clifford Petersen, Comment, In Search of a Proper Balance, 22 GONZ. L.R. 259, 259
(1986-87). The new Pennsylvania automobile insurance law reflects a recognition by the legis-
lature of these efforts in other states, particularly Michigan and California. See Bruce H.
Stern, Pennsylvania May Look West to Resolve Insurance Dilemma, PA L.J. REP., Sept. 8,
1989, at 3.
3. See INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, 1990 PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURANCE
FACTS 8 (1989) (reporting that California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, West Virginia and Wisconsin, as well
as Pennsylvania, have experienced automobile insurance reform movements).
4. In Philadelphia, uninsured motorists cause one of every three accidents. Michael de
Courey Hinds, Uninsured Drivers Create Other Kinds of Wreckage, NEW YORK TIMES, Sept.
3, 1990, at 1. Whether uninsured drivers are the cause or merely a consequence of high insur-
ance rates, they are central to automobile insurance problems.
5. At an average of $620.33 per year, Pennsylvania insurance premiums are the fifth
highest in the nation. Id. at 10. The study also reported that between 5.1% and 10% of
Pennsylvania motorists are uninsured. Id.
6. Richard N. Clark et al., Sources of the Crisis in Liability Insurance: An Economic
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problem is America's overly-litigious society' and advocate tort re-
form as the solution.8 Other commentators point to fundamental
anomalies within the insurance industry and call for systemic re-
form.' The dilemma confronted by any reform plan is to reconcile
these conflicting theories. Consumer groups, special interest groups
and the powerful insurance lobby serve to complicate the reform pro-
cess as legislatures seek to achieve meaningful rate regulation while
maintaining a competitive insurance market.
After entertaining various proposals over the past several
years,10 Pennsylvania responded to the automobi][e insurance crisis
by passing sweeping legislation,11 following the lead of Michigan and
Analysis, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 367 (1988) outlines four theories on the cause of the liability
insurance crisis: 1) insurance industry collusion and conspiracy creating popular perception of
an insurance crisis; 2) unwise business practices by insurers; 3) defects in state regulation of
the insurance industry and; 4) changes in substantive tort law and the damage/compensation
system.
7. The assertion that our society's proclivity for lawsuits is on the rise is debatable. See
William B. Glaberson and Christopher Farrell, The Explosion in Liability Lawsuits Is Noth-
ing But a Myth, Bus, WK., April 21, 1986, at 24-25. A study of state court trends from 1981-
1984, a critical period in the insurance crisis, found that the rate of litigation at least remained
constant, if not decreased, during the period. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS. COURT
STATISTICS AND INFORMATION PROJECT, A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF AVAILABLE CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL TREND DATA IN STATE TRIAL COURTS FOR 1978, 19:31 AND 1984. One author
suggests that such evidence questions the existence of a "litigation explosion" and asserts that
large caseloads in state and federal courts may be attributable to factors other than a rise in
litigation. See Rumors of Crisis, supra note 1, at 414-18. See also Bernard Von Ogtrop, We
Need Insurance Reform, Not Tort Deform, 7 DEL. LAW 35 (1989) (asserting that the practice
of cash-flow underwriting, whereby insurers sell policies low when investments are high and
sell policies high when investments are low, is the real cause of escalating insurance
premiums).
8. Insurance companies, business groups, and the medical profession are the foremost
advocates of tort reform. Generally, their reform agenda includes proposals for damage caps,
limits on non-economic damages and attorneys fees, and modification or elimination of joint
and several liability and the collateral source rule. Clark, supra note 6; Patricia Rogero, Insur-
ance Groups and Trial Lawyers Vie Over Reforms, Los ANGELES DAILY J., March 23, 1987,
at 1.
9. Rumors of Crisis, supra note 1, at 408-14. Critics of tort reform charge the insurance
industry with creating the perception of an insurance crisis through vigorous lobbying efforts
and a campaign portraying the tort system as defective. Rumors 6f Crisis, supra note 1, at
408-14. See Clark, supra note 6. Consumer and labor groups as well as plaintiffs' trial lawyers
have resisted tort reform and advocated for more regulation of the insurance industry. Rogero,
supra note 8, at 1.
10. See debate, Senate of Pennsylvania on the Conference Report, Feb. 7, 1990, and
House debate on H.B. 121, PN 2907, LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL-HOUSE, 2141, December 12,
1989. In the course of debate in favor of passing the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility
Law of 1990, legislators made reference to the struggle over the past several years to draft
acceptable, cost-effective insurance reform. Philadelphia legislators pushed hardest for accept-
ance of the new Pennsylvania motor vehicle insurance law, and their campaign was facilitated
by efforts of the Governor's Office. Interview with George F. Douglas (Oct. 13, 1990) (Mr.
Douglas is a well-known central Pennsylvania trial lawyer and an expert in the field of Penn-
sylvania automobile insurance.).
I1. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1701 (1990). The new insurance law is frequently referred to
as Act 6 of 1990.
FREEZE AND ROLLBACK MEASURES
California. 2 The legislation's highlights include: a provision allowing
insureds to elect the limited tort option (the "verbal threshold");' 3 a
cap on the amount health care providers can bill insurance compa-
nies for services provided to insured accident victims;14 an insurance
fraud provision; 5 a bad faith clause allowing policy holders to sue
their insurers for punitive damages;16 and a provision lowering the
first-party insurance minimum from $10,000 to $5,000.7 Concurrent
amendments to the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, 8 the Rules of Civil
Procedure,' 9 and the Vehicle Code2" illustrate the legislature's deter-
mination to effect fundamental changes in Pennsylvania motor vehi-
cle insurance law.
The most controversial provision of the new Pennsylvania insur-
ance law is the rate freeze and rollback measure.21 This provision,
effective July 1, 1990, required an immediate rollback and freeze of
rates at December 1, 1989 levels and subsequent mandatory roll-
backs of 22% for insureds electing the limited tort option and 10%
for those electing the full tort option.22
Insurance companies challenging the constitutionality of the
new law argued that it effects a taking under the Fifth23 and Four-
teenth24 Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article
1, Section Ten of the Pennsylvania Constitution." Automobile insur-
12. The new Pennsylvania law closely follows the trend set by Michigan in adopting the
"verbal threshold" or "limited tort option", 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1705 (1990), and the cap on
the amounts health care providers can bill insurance companies for services provided to insured
accident victims, 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1797 (1990). Compare MICH. STAT. ANN. § 24.13101
(1982). See also Stern, supra note 2, at 3.
The rate freeze and rollback provisions of the new Pennsylvania law found in 75 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 1799.7 (1990) are very similar to California's Proposition 103 put into effect in
1988. See CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.01 (West 1988).
13. 75 PA. CONS. STAT § 1705 (1990).
14. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1797 (1990).
15. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4117 (1990).
16. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8355 and 8371 (1990).
17. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1711 (1990).
18. 18 PA.CONS. STAT. § 4117 (1990).
19. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8355 and 8371 (1990).
20. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1701 (1990). The legislature also amended the Vehicle Code
in §§ 1305 and 1306 (relating to self-certification of financial responsibility), § 1318 (relating
to duties of insurance agents) and § 1540 (relating to suspension and revocation of registration
and licenses). See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1305, 1306, 1318, 1540 (1990).
21. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1799.7 (1990).
22. See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text. This provision has also been the sub-
ject of a great deal of debate. See C. Christopher Hasson and Michael F. Nerone, The 1990
Pennsylvania Insurance Law: An Analysis of "Bad Faith" and the "Limited Tort Option", 29
DuQ. L. REV. 619 (1991); Bruce H. Stern, Limitations on Right to Sue May Not Cut Car
Insurance, PA. L.J. REP., Sept. 25, 1989, at 3.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
25. PA. CONST. art. I, § 10. Insurance companies also attack the new Pennsylvania insur-
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ance companies claim they cannot operate profitably in the Pennsyl-
vania insurance market if forced to comply with the new laws.2"
Consequently, some companies elected to cease writing automobile
policies in Pennsylvania. 7 In addition, insurance companies and
many outside observers assert that the new law will not achieve its
intended objective of permanently reducing and stabilizing automo-
bile insurance rates.2
This Comment analyzes the constitutionality of the rate freeze
and rollback provisions of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial
Responsibility Law of 199029 under traditional constitutional takings
jurisprudence. It will first trace the recent history of motor vehicle
insurance in Pennsylvania, discussing the movement from no-fault
insurance to the fault-based system under which the present law op-
erates. Second, it will address state and federal due process concerns
raised by Pennsylvania insurers challenging the constitutionality of
the rate rollbacks. Both substantive and procedural due process chal-
lenges are considered, with emphasis on the procedural claims. The
mainspring of these constitutional challenges emanates from the re-
lief provisions of the new law that allow insurance companies to seek
exemption if sufficiently aggrieved by the rollbacks.3 0 The relief pro-
visions will be analyzed by comparing them with a similar automo-
bile insurance rate rollback law enacted in California. a" Finally, this
ance law on other constitutional -grounds. See Bruce Ledewitz, Courts Busy With Challenges
to Pennsylvania's Insurance Laws, PA L.J. REP., March 26, 1990, at 1; Joan C. McKenna,
Part of Insurance Law Blocked by Court Order, PA. L.J. REP., April 16, 1990, at 9.
26. It is clear that in regulating business states must allow an enterprise to obtain a fair
rate of return on its investments. Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989).
27. Aetna Life & Casualty Company and Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company
threatened to leave the state automobile insurance market before reaching a compromise with
the Insurance Department. The two companies agreed to comply with the rollback provisions
and rescind approximately 11,000 non-renewal notices that had been sent to policy holders.
Michael Schachner, Two Insurers to Remain In Pennsylvania Auto Market, Bus. INS., June 4,
1990, at 50. All major insurance companies finally came into compliance with the law while
awaiting the outcome of judicial challenges or pursuing exemptions from the Insurance De-
partment. Telephone Interview with Amy Dugan, Insurance Department Press Secretary (Oct.
4, 1990). The constitutional challenges to the rollback provisions have all been resolved or
dropped, but many insurers continue to apply for extraordinary circumstances relief. Interview
with Insurance Department staff attorney (Jan. 28, 1992).
28. See Insurers Fault New Auto Rate Law, BUs. INS., Feb. 19, 1990, at 1; McKenna,
supra note 25, at 9.
29. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1701 (1990).
30. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1799.7(d) (1990). Pennsylvania's Commissioner of Insurance
considers this section to be a constitutional safety valve, which authorizes her to grant the
necessary relief from any potentially confiscatory rates imposed on insurance companies by the
rollback measures. See Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Foster, 739 F. Supp. 962, 964 (M.D.
Pa. 1990).
31. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.01 (West 1988). A virtual consumer revolt over high auto-
mobile insurance rates culminated in California voters passing Proposition 103, codified as §
1861.01 of California's Insurance Code. This law was later invalidated, in part due to its lack
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Comment will address whether the rate rollback provisions will actu-
ally translate into cost savings for consumers and will attempt to
formulate a prognosis as to the future of automobile insurance in
Pennsylvania.
II. History of Motor Vehicle Insurance in Pennsylvania
In the past decade, motor vehicle insurance in Pennsylvania has
been filled with uncertainty, remaining in a constant state of flux.
The inadequacies of the No-Fault Act, 2 enacted in 1974, were read-
ily apparent by the 1980's. The no-fault insurance system was in-
tended to provide and require first party coverage for economic loss
up to a threshold level regardless of fault, thereby eliminating negli-
gence actions for economic loss up to that level.3 3 The only allowable
negligence actions under no-fault insurance were those for pain and
suffering arising out of serious injury exceeding the threshold level. 4
Under the no-fault automobile insurance system, most lawsuits are
first-party actions, i.e., the insured suing his or her own insurance
company by asserting a covered loss. Since fault is eliminated, the
process is intended to be more streamlined. The theoretical purposes
of no-fault insurance are to compensate victims regardless of fault,
provide equitable payment of benefits, reduce litigation and its cor-
relative costs, and reduce liability insurance premiums.3 5 The reduc-
tion of transaction costs is intended to translate into lower
premiums.a"
Pennsylvania's no-fault insurance system failed to meet its
goals. Premiums soared and litigation over the interpretation of vari-
ous terms of the No-Fault Act proliferated. 7 The central problem
of adequate procedural safeguards. See Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247 (Cal.
1989).
32. 40 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1009.101 (1974).
33. Robert E. Keeton & Jefferey O'Connell, Alternative Paths Toward Nonfault Auto-
mobile Insurance, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 241, 245 (1971). See also Alan J. Karcher, No More
No Fault: Beyond the Rhetoric Toward True Reform of the New Jersey Automobile Insur-
ance System, 8 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 173, 176 (1984).
34. See generally Keeton & O'Connell, supra note 33.
35. GEORGE JAMES COUCH, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 45:661 (2d ed.
1959).
36. Id. See also Michael E. Herron, No-Fault System Needs Repair, PA. L.J. REP., Feb.
8, 1982, at 2.
37. By 1984, when the No-Fault Act was finally abolished, premiums had increased by
206 percent. Karcher, supra note 33, at 173. States without no-fault auto insurance exper-
ienced much lower increases in premiums. Karcher, supra note 33, at 173.
A large volume of first party actions caused many provisions of the No-Fault Act to be
called into question, and the courts did not resolve many of these issues until years after the
Act's implementation. See Allstate Insurance Co. v. Heffner, 421 A.2d 629 (Pa. 1980) (provi-
sion of the Act entitling accident victims to $15,000 in work loss payments held to apply to
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was that the No-Fault Act did not impose a limit on medical ex-
penses collectable from the insurer.3 8 Regardless of the circum-
stances of the accident, the policy holder was entfitled to these pay-
ments. Many other states that enacted some form of no-fault auto
insurance experienced similar problems.39 Thus, well into the 1980's,
Pennsylvania insureds were left with unfulfilled promises of rate sav-
ings, and the courts were left with a backlog of cases regarding the
interpretation of various provisions of the No-Fault Act.
A. The Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law
The Pennsylvania legislature responded to the failures of no-
fault automobile insurance by repealing the No-Fault Act in 1984
and instituting the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsi-
bility Law. 0 The new law did more than alter tort procedures in the
context of automobile insurance, it affected the substantive rights of
policy holders. 1 The central change effected by the new law was the
removal of the full first party basis of automobile insurance in Penn-
sylvania. In an attempt to cure the infirmities of the No-Fault Act,
the new law reduced unlimited medical coverage to a mandatory
$10,000 minimum,42 reduced the amount of work-loss benefits from
$15,000 to $5,000,"8 required all policies to include uninsured/un-
deceased insureds). However, Heffner was overturned in a later ctse because of a newly en-
acted statute. See Persik v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 554 A.2d 930 (Pa. Super. 1989),
appeal denied, 563 A.2d 499 (Pa. 1989). See also Martin v. Soblotney, 466 A.2d 1022 (Pa.
1983) (medical bills held inadmissible to determine award for pain and suffering); Sachritz v.
Pennsylvania Nat'l Mutual Casualty Ins. Co., 455 A.2d 101 (Pa. 1982) (statutes of limitation
and repose under the No-Fault Act).
These cases are merely a sampling of the litigation produced by the ambiguities within
the No-Fault Act. Other problems, including questions of stacking, amount of medical cover-
age, and subrogation, plagued the No-Fault Act and resulted in large economic losses for
insurance companies, which translated into higher premiums. George F. Douglas, Working
With the New "Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law." This Article was presented as
part of the Continuing Legal Education Program on Tort Law Developments, Feb. 28 through
March I, 1986, Dickinson School of Law, Carlisle, PA.
38. Interview with George F. Douglas, supra note 10. Mr. Douglas explained that un-
limited medical expense coverage was a major infirmity because insured accident victims could
collect large sums from their insurance company even when the accident was due to the gross
negligence of the insured.
39. See Karcher, supra note 33, at 176. Fourteen other states enacted no-fault statutes
around the same time that Pennsylvania enacted its statute. See Karcher, supra note 33, at
176. See also Jefferey O'Connell and Robert H. Joost, Giving Motorists a Choice Between
Fault and No-Fault Insurance, 72 VA. L REV. 61 (1986).
40. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1731 (1984). The No-Fault Act and the new law overlapped
by one year since the new law, although passed in 1983, did not go into effect until October 1,
1984.
41. Interview with George F. Douglas, supra note 10.
42. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1711 (1984).
43. Id.
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derinsured motorist coverage in specified amounts,"4 and eliminated
stacking. 45 Other substantive changes were also made."6 Despite the
elimination of many first party coverage problems, however, the Fi-
nancial Responsibility Law did not realize the anticipated cost
savings.
From 1984 through 1989 the Financial Responsibility Law gov-
erned automobile insurance in Pennsylvania while the courts contin-
ued to resolve the last remnants of the No-Fault Act.47 Problems
persisted during this period. The legislature passed various amend-
ments dealing with defects in the law, but these efforts were mostly
unsuccessful in bringing about meaningful changes in automobile in-
surance law. In this context, prompted mainly by Philadelphia legis-
lators whose districts were most affected by spiraling insurance rates,
the legislature passed Act 6 of 1990.48
B. The Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law of 1990
Immediately after enactment of the Motor Vehicle Financial
Responsibility Law of 1990, insurers initiated constitutional chal-
lenges to various provisions in both state and federal courts. " Key-
stone, Ohio Casualty, Nationwide and Erie filed suit in federal court
requesting preliminary injunctions against the rate rollbacks.50 Si-
multaneous challenges were filed in state courts. 5' In all, thirty-six
cases were filed challenging various provisions of the new law. 52
44. 75 PA. CONS. STAT, § 1734 (1984).
45. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1717 (1984). Stacking is the practice of adding coverage limits
on multiple vehicles covered under the same policy or under separate policies toachieve a
higher recovery on a claim. See GEORGE JAMES COUCH, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE
LAW, §§ 56:34, 45:641 and 45:628 (2d ed. 1959).
46. See James R. Ronca, New Insurance Law Effective October 1, PA L.J. REP., Feb. 20,
1984, at I. See also Interview with George F. Douglas, supra note 10.
47. See supra note 37.
48. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1701 (1990).
49. See Joan C. McKenna, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Asked to Resolve Insurance
Dispute, PA. L. J. REP., June 11, 1990, at I (analysis of the medical provisions); Clifford A.
Reiders, A New Twist in Insurance Law, PA. L.J. REP., April 19, 1990, at 2 (analysis of the
subrogation provisions). See generally Joan C. McKenna, Insurance Law Creates New Litiga-
tion, PA. L.J. REP., Feb. 19, 1990, at I (early analysis of the Motor Vehicle Financial Respon-
sibility Law of 1990).
50. See, e.g., Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Foster, 739 F. Supp. 962 (M.D. Pa. 1990);
Keystone Ins. Co. v. Foster, 732 F. Supp. 36 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
51. See, e.g., Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Insurance Dep't, 585 A.2d 1160 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1990).
52. Telephone Interview with Amy Dugan, Insurance Department Press Secretary (Oct.
4, 1990). See also Ledewitz, supra note 25, at 3; McKenna, supra note 25, at 1.
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lI. Procedural Background
Challenges to the rate freeze and rollback provisions of the new
Pennsylvania motor vehicle insurance law5 al the federal level
proved unsuccessful in the trial courts. District courts denied prelim-
inary injunctions and upheld the constitutionality of the rollbacks
under the Due Process Clause." However, at the state level, consti-
tutional challenges to the law were more successful. State Farm Mu-
tual Auto Insurance Co. v. Insurance Dep't55 held that the initial
rate freeze period56 imposed an unconstitutional burden on insurance
companies because the rate rollback relief provision did not apply
during this period." The main part of the rollback law,58 however,
has withstood constitutional scrutiny. To obtain relief from the rate
rollbacks, insurance companies are limited to the relief provisions
provided by the new law.59 As such, they must file with the insur-
ance commissioner to obtain exemption from the rollbacks.60
53. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1799.7 (1990).
54. Nationwide, 739 F. Supp. 962 (M.D. Pa. 1990); Keystone, 732 F. Supp. 36 (E.D.
Pa. 1990).
55. 577 A.2d 951 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990).
56. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1799.7(d) (1990). This section provides:
In order to provide stability during the period of transition leading up to the
effective date of the amendments to this chapter and to assure fair and equitable
treatment of insurers and insureds, it is in the best interests of the Common-
wealth to temporarily suspend the adoption of new private passenger motor ve-
hicle rates. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, all private
passenger rates in effect on December 1, 1989, may not be changed so as to be
eJfective prior to July 1, 1990. Any rate requests filed with the commissioner to
be effective on or after December 1, 1989, whether or not such rates were ap-
proved by the commissioner or by operation of law prior to, on or after Decem-
ber I, 1989, are hereby disapproved as being in conflict with this chapter.
Id. (emphasis added).
57. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Insurance Dep't, 577 A.2d 951 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1990).
58. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1799.7(b) (1990). This section provides:
The rates charged by insurers under the filing required by subsection (a) shall be
reduced from current rates as follows:
(1) For an insured electing the limited tort option under section 1705
(relating to election of tort options), the total premium charged for any
selection of coverages and coverage limits shall be reduced by at least
22% from the total premium for the same selection of coverages and cov-
erage limits in effect on December I, 1989.
(2) For an insured bound by the full tort option under section 1705, the
total premium charged for any selection of coverages and coverage limits
shall be reduced by at least 10% from the total premium for the same
coverage limits in effect on December I, 1989.
Id. (emphasis added).
59. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1799.7(b)(3) (1990). This section provides: "An insurer ag-
grieved by the rate reductions mandated by this subsection may seek relief from the commis-
sioner, which relief may be granted when the commissioner deems necessary in extraordinary
circumstances." Id.
60. Id. See Keystone Ins. Co. v. Foster, 732 F. Supp. 36 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that
FREEZE AND ROLLBACK MEASURES
Some insurers concluded that they could no longer operate prof-
itably in the Pennsylvania automobile insurance market and
threatened to stop writing automobile insurance policies in the
state."1 The Insurance Department, however, reached a compromise
with several major insurers and engendered compliance with the new
law pending the outcome of judicial challenges.
62
Insurance companies have posited two constitutional challenges
to the rate rollback provisions. First, they aver a deprivation of a fair
rate of return on their investments.6" They claim the law does not
contain adequate procedures to avoid the confiscatory nature of the
rollback provisions and thus violates the Due Process Clause." Sec-
ond, insurance companies contend that the rollbacks bear no rational
relation to a legitimate government objective. 5 They contend that
rollbacks are arbitrary and discriminatory, resulting in a violation of
substantive rights under the Due Process Clause.6
IV. Constitutional Analysis
Under the rollback provisions of the new law, insurance compa-
nies were required to immediately freeze and rollback their rates to
the level in effect on December 1, 1989.67 Furthermore, the law re-
quired additional rollbacks from the December 1, 1989 level of 10%
the determination of whether "extraordinary circumstances" exist in order to obtain relief
from the rate rollbacks is a decision that must be made by the Insurance Department and not
by the courts). As of December 1991, 237 insurance companies applied for extraordinary cir-
cumstances relief under § 1799.7(b)(3). Telephone Interview with Insurance Department Press
Office (Nov. 26, 1991). According to Insurance Department sources, 109 companies obtained
extraordinary circumstances relief in some form. Id.
61. In September 1990, State Farm, Pennsylvania's largest automobile insurer, an-
nounced that it would write no new policies due to the rate rollbacks. State Farm Will Reject
New Policies, PA. L.J. REP., Sept. 17, 1990, at 9. See also supra note 27 and infra note 62.
62. Schachner, supra note 27. According to Amy Dugan, the Insurance Department's
Press Secretary, all insurers are now in compliance with the law, and only two small compa-
nies intend to pull out of the Pennsylvania auto insurance market as a resuli of the new law.
Telephone Interview with Amy Dugan (Oct. 4, 1990). See also supra note 27. According to
Ms. Dugan, the House was scheduled to consider a bill that would prohibit insurers wanting to
withdraw from the Pennsylvania auto insurance market from selling other lines of insurance in
the state. Id. However, as of the time this Comment was printed no such bill wa's introduced.
Telephone Interview with Spike Lukens, Acting Insurance Department Press Secretary (Nov.
26, 1991).
63. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Insurance Dep't, 577 A.2d 951 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1990). See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989) (holding that businesses
have a right to a fair rate of return on investments).
64. See State Farm, 577 A.2d 951; Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Insurance Dep't, 583
A.2d 507 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990).
65. See Brief of Amici Curiae State Farm, Nationwide and Allstate Insurance Compa-
nies in Support of Reversal of the District Court Denial of a Preliminary Injunction, Keystone
Ins. Co. v. Foster, 732 F. Supp. 36 (E.D. Pa. 1990) [hereinafter "Brief of Amici Curiae"].
66. Id.
67. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1799.7(d) (1990).
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for policyholders electing the full tort option"8 and 22% for those
electing the limited tort option.6 9 All pending rate filings and all rate
increases approved to become effective after December 1, 1989 were
automatically disapproved.7" An insurance company aggrieved by
the rate reductions could obtain relief or exemption at the discretion
of the insurance commissioner if "necessary in extraordinary circum-
stances"-the so-called "constitutional safety valve." 7 The question
addressed by this Comment is whether this provision presents a po-
tential taking without, due process of law.
A. State and Federal Due Process Considerations
Insurance companies challenging the Financial Responsibility
Law of 1990 have raised both substantive and procedural due pro-
cess concerns. The procedural due process analysis questions whether
the provisions of the insurance law afford adequate protections
against confiscatory rates.72 Substantive due process analysis, on the
other hand, examines limits on the power of state legislatures to reg-
ulate economic rights.7" Substantive due process analysis is con-
cerned with the nexus between the state's regulation of the insurance
industry and the means used to effectuate that goal. 4
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, "No state shall .. .deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."75 The Pennsylvania State
Constitution affords similar protections in Artlicle I Section Ten,
which states that no property "shall be taken or applied to public use
without authority of law and without just compensation being first
made or secured. 76 Pennsylvania courts have adopted the same
standard under the Pennsylvania Constitution as the federal courts
68. Under 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1705(a)(1)(B) (1990) policyholders can choose a form
of insurance that allows an unrestricted right to sue for injuries caused by other drivers. These
policyholders can seek recovery for pain and suffering as well as for all medical costs and other
out-of-pocket expenses. See also supra note 22.
69. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1799.7(b)(1),(2) (1990). Under 75 PA. CONS. STAT. §
1705(a)(1)(A), a policyholder can elect the limited tort option in exchange for a lower pre-
mium, thereby waiving the right to sue for pain and suffering unless the injuries fall within the
definition of "serious injury." Recovery is limited to medical and other out-of-pocket expenses.
See also supra note 22.
70. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1799.7(d) (1990).
71. Id. § 1799.7(b)(3).
72. See State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Insurance Dep't, 577 A.2d 951 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1990).
73. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
74. Id.
75. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
76. PA. CONST., art i, § 10.
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employ in reviewing allegations of unconstitutional takings under the
United States Constitution.17 A recent case, however, suggests that
Pennsylvania will interpret its constitution to provide broader protec-
tion of private property rights than does the United States
Constitution.78
To determine whether a state statute effects a taking without
due process of law, courts first ask whether the statute interferes
with or restricts a substantive property right. 79 If the statute inter-
feres with such a property right, the second inquiry requires a deter-
mination of what process is due. 80 At this point, courts weigh the
private interest in procedural protection against the governmental in-
terests involved.81 Three factors are particularly relevant to this in-
quiry: (1.) the character of the governmental regulation; (2) the eco-
nomic impact of the regulation on the private entity; and (3) the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct, invest-
ment-backed expectations.8"
The property interest affected by the rollback provisions of the
Pennsylvania insurance law is the right to a fair rate of return on
investment in light of the risks.8" Insurance companies assert that
the rollback provisions force them to operate their automobile insur-
ance businesses at a loss.8 Nationwide claimed that for the effective
period of the initial rate freeze,85 it would experience an underwrit-
77. See Pennsylvania Coal Mining Ass'n v. Insurance Dep't, 370 A.2d 685, 689 (Pa.
1977). Pennsylvania courts, however, may in some cases more rigorously scrutinize economic
regulation of business than federal courts do. See Ledewitz, supra note 25, at I, 24. The
author suggested that cases challenging the constitutionality of the insurance law would be
more successful in Pennsylvania courts. Ledewitz, supra note 25, at 1, 24.
78. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, No. 48 E.D. Appeal
Docket 1990, 7/10/91, reh'ggranted, 9/4/91 (1991 WL 128352), held that the Philadelphia's
Historic Buildings, Structures, Sites, Objects and District provisions of the Philadelphia Code
constitute a taking of property for public use in violation of PA. CONST., art. I, sec. 10. The
provisions allowed the Philadelphia Historical Commission to place restrictions on demolition
or renovation of designated structures. In holding that the Pennsylvania Constitution affords
greater protection of private property rights than the U.S. Constitution, the court deviates
from U.S. Supreme Court precedent.
79. United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958), rehg de-
nied, 358 U.S. 858 (1958); accord Hasinecz v. Pennsylvania State Police, 515 A.2d 351 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1986).
80. Pennsylvania Coal Mining Ass'n, 370 A.2d at 689.
81. Id.
82. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978), rehg
denied, 449 U.S. 883 (1978).
83. Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989).
84. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 65, at 2-5.
85. Nationwide was referring to the initial freeze period under 75 PA. CONS. STAT. §
1799.7(d). See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 65, at 2. During this period, Nationwide
asserted that its rate of return would be negative 0.4%. See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note
65, at 3.
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ing loss of approximately $3,900,000 per month, representing claims
paid as compared to premiums collected.86 Keystone claimed it
would suffer losses of $34,490 per day;87 State Farm claimed losses
of $180,000 per day.88 Allstate also claimed it would suffer signifi-
cant losses.8 9
These losses were calculated mainly on the basis of the initial
rate freeze period, 0 but the companies projected the effects of the
losses would reach far beyond this period. Thus, the rate rollback
would result in a permanent, non-recoverable deprivation of prop-
erty."' However, the initial freeze and rollback period92 should be
considered separately from the subsequent freeze and rollback
period .
93
1. Procedural Due Process Considerations In Regard To Rate
Filings During the Initial Freeze Period.-The first area of Pennsyl-
vania's new insurance law to come under constitutional attack was
the immediate rate freeze mandated between December 1, 1989 and
July 1, 1990. In Pennsylvania, insurance companies are required to
file rates sought to be charged with the Insurance Department to
obtain approval. 4 Subsection (d) of Section 1799.7 of the Financial
Resopnsibility Law provides in pertinent part:
In order to provide stability during the period of transition lead-
ing up to the effective dates of the amendments to this chapter
and to assure fair and equitable treatment of insurers and in-
sureds, it is in the best interest of the Commonwealth to tempo-
rarily suspend the adoption of new private passenger motor vehi-
cle rates.9 5
In addition, this subsection provided for the retroactive suspen-
sion of rate filings and rates already approved that were to become
effective on or after December 1, 1989.96 The relief provisions,97
86. See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 65, at 2.
87. See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 65, at 7.
88. See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 65, at 4.
89. See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 65, at 2.
90. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1799.7(d) (1990).
91. See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 65, at 8, 20-26.
92. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1799.7(d) (1990).
93. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1799.7(b),(e) (1990). The subsequent freeze and rollback pe-
riod required insurers to file for new rates and prohibited increase.s after June 30, 1990.
94. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1799.7(a) (1990). The Motor Vehicle Insurance Rate Review
Procedures Act, 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2001 (1990), provides the procedures for reviewing rate
filings and reviewing Insurance Department decisions.
95. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1799.7(d) (1990).
96. Id.
97. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1799.7(b)(3) (1990).
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which permit an insurer to escape mandatory rate reductions upon a
showing of extraordinary circumstances, did not apply during this
period.98
The first problem encountered by the new Act was the question
of whether the procedural relief provision9" protected against a tak-
ing of property caused by the retroactive disapproval of rates that
were already approved to become effective after December 1, 1989,
but did not take effect before enactment of the new insurance law. In
State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Insurance Dep't, the court held
unconstitutional the application of the freeze and rollback provisions
to rates in effect between December 1, 1989 and July 1, 1990 be-
cause it provided no review of mandatory rates effective during that
period.' 00 The court reasoned that substantive property rights had
attached pursuant to contract (the approved rate filing).' Thus, due
process required the Commonwealth to provide an examination or
review before these rights could be deprived."0 2
The drafters of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Re-
sponsibility Law of 1990 intended that the extraordinary circum-
stances relief provision"0 ' would be a "constitutional safety valve"
that afforded due process safeguards. 104 This section provides:
An insurer aggrieved by the rate reductions mandated by this
section may seek relief from the commissioner, which relief may
be granted when the commissioner deems necessary in ex-
traordinary circumstances.'
As applied to rate filings already approved, however, this section was
ineffective becadse the commissioner lacked authority to examine
rates during the "window period" between December 1, 1989 and
July 1, 1990.06
98. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 179917(b)(3) (1990) applied only to new rate filings under
subsection (a). Therefore, as held in State Farm Mutual Auto Ins, Co. v. Insurance Dep't, 577
A.2d 951 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990), the Commissioner lacked authority to examine after July 1,
1990, rates that were rolled back under subsection (d).
99. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1799.7(b)(3) (1990).
100. State Farm, 577 A.2d 951; accord Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Insurance Dep't,
583 A.2d 507 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990).
101. State Farm, 577 A.2d at 953-54.
102. Id.
103. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1799.7(b)(3) (1990).
104. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Foster, 739 F. Supp. 962, 964 (M.D. Pa. 1990).
Pennsylvania's insurance commissioner interprets this provision as authorizing her to grant
whatever relief is required by the constitutional safeguards protecting against confiscatory
rates. Id.
105. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1799.7(b)(3) (1990) (emphasis added).
106. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Insurance Dep't, 577 A.2d 951, 954-55 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1990).
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Since the extraordinary circumstances provision did not afford
procedural safeguards against confiscatory rates during the initial
freeze period, the state could not roll back insurance rates that were
already approved. The court in State Farm rejected the Common-
wealth's argument that any losses suffered during this period were
merely temporary because they could be recouped through post-May
1, 1990 rate filings. °7 The court held that since the Act afforded no
procedural protections during the initial freeze period, losses could
not be considered merely temporary. 108 Thus, to force a company to
recoup losses sustained during that interim period by passing on
costs to subsequent policyholders in the next filing period would vio-
late the Pennsylvania Rate Act. 0 9
In retrospect, the question in State Farm was not whether the
new insurance law provided adequate procedural safeguards against
confiscatory rates, but whether it provided any review process. The
adequacy of the extraordinary circumstances provision was not at
issue because the commissioner had no authority under the Act to
apply this provision to rate filings already approved. State Farm
challenged the freeze and rollback provisions only as applied to the
window period from December 1, 1989 to July 1, 1990."1 Thus,
State Farm left intact the more important freeze and rollback
provisions."'
2. Facial Constitutionality of Rate Rollbacks.-The funda-
mental challenge to the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Re-
sponsibility Law of 1990 concerns the facial validity of the rate
rollback provision as applied to new mandatory rate filings effective
after July 1, 1990.12 In Keystone Ins. Co. v. Insurance Dep't, the
court upheld the constitutionality of the statute." 3 First, the court
found that over the Act's seventeen month effective period, the roll-
backs did not necessarily effect a confiscation." '4 Second, the court
107. Id. at 954.
108. Id.
109. Id. (citing the Rate Act, 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1183(d) (1986), which prohibits
setting rates that are excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory).
110. Id. at 953.
I1. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1799.7(b) and (e) (1990).
112. See Brief of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania In Support Of Commonwealth's Mo-
tion To Dismiss, And In Opposition To The Petition For Review And Supplemental Repro-
duced Record, at 25, 26, Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Insurance Dep't, No. 321 C.D. (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1990) [hereinafter "Brief of Commonwealth in Nationwide"].
113. Keystone Ins. Co. v. Insurance Dep't, 732 F. Supp. 36 (E.D. Pa 1990). See also
Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Insurance Dep't, 585 A.2d 1160 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (holding
that the across-the-board reduction of auto insurance rates did not violate equal protection).
114. Keystone, 732 F. Supp. at 38. The court conceded that the weight of evidence
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held that the constitutional safety valve" 5 was sufficient to avert a
takings problem because insurance companies could obtain rate re-
lief from the rollbacks by showing extraordinary circumstances." 6
Likewise, Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Foster denied injunctive relief from
the rate rollbacks because the court found no irreparable injury and
no showing of likelihood of success on the merits of the due process
claim.' 17
a. Comparison to California's Automobile Insurance
Rate Rollbacks.-Keystone and Nationwide reached different re-
sults than the California courts in considering a similar insurance
rate rollback law. California's Proposition 103 froze rates between
November 8, 1988 and November 8, 1989 and instituted rollbacks of
up to 20%."18 Insurance companies could obtain relief from these
rates only if the commissioner of insurance found that an insurer was
threatened with insolvency."' Calfarm Insurance Co. v. Deukmejian
held California's rate rollback provision unconstitutional because an
insurer could not obtain relief from confiscatory rates during the
freeze period. 2 Similarly, Pennsylvania's "extraordinary circum-
stances" standard for relief from the mandatory rate rollbacks of the
initial rate freeze period lacks the requisite procedural protections
for insurers during that period. 2' Beyond this period, however, Sec-
tion 1799.7(b)(3), the "constitutional safety valve" provision, takes
effect and operates as a procedural protection against confiscatory
rates.
favored the plaintiffs, but stated that this evidence was insufficient to establish a constitutional
violation. Id. Keystone did not overcome the statute's presumption of validity, particularly in
light of the fact that Keystone had not yet completed the procedural relief process provided in
the statute itself. This left the court without a rate setting record on which to base its decision.
Id.
115. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1799.7(b)(3) (1990).
116. Keystone, 732 F. Supp. at 38.
117. Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Foster, 739 F. Supp. 962 (M.D. Pa. 1990). The court held
that there was no irreparable injury due to the availability of relief under 75 PA. CONS, STAT. §
1799.7(b)(3) (1990).
118. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.01 (West 1988). Proposition 103 was a response to skyrock-
eting automobile insurance rates in California caused by the passage in 1984 of a provision
requiring all motorists to purchase liability insurance and show proof of financial responsibil-
ity. See Robinson-McCalister Financial Responsibility Act, Ch. 1322, 1984 Cal. Stat. 4546.
See John J. Knoll, Note, Kansas Automobile Insurance: Current Issues and Problems, 29
WASH L. J. 600 (1990).
119. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.01(b) (West 1988). This section was found unconstitutional
in Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247 (Cal. 1989).
120. Calfarm, 771 P.2d 1247. The court held the rollback provision was severable from
the remainder of the insurance initiative. Id.
121. See supra notes 94-111 and accompanying text for discussion of the initial rate
freeze period.
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Applying the California courts' approach to the Pennsylvania
insurance law, the central issue is whether the extraordinary circum-
stance provision122 adequately protects against confiscatory rates
caused by the rate rollback over the full seventeen months of the
Act's application and beyond. 123 Calfarm held that a regulatory stat-
ute must expressly empower the authority that administers the stat-
ute to eliminate confiscatory results in order to comply with due pro-
cess requirements."2 4 Regarding the rate freeze and rollback
provision of Proposition 103, Calfarm did not dispute the state's au-
thority to roll back insurance rates, but held that the standard for
obtaining relief from potentially confiscatory rates was constitution-
ally insufficient. 215 The statute precluded insurance companies from
obtaining relief if they were technically "solvent," even though the
rates were constitutionally insufficient, since the determination of
solvency referred to the company's assets and liabilities as a
whole.' 2 6 Practically, the solvency of the insurer is irrelevant because
any confiscatory rates should be considered unconstitutional regard-
less of an insurance company's overall financial condition.
The Pennsylvania legislature apparently recognized the consti-
tutional infirmity in California's insurance rollback plan by provid-
ing for relief upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances."' The
magnitude of the distinction between California's insolvency stan-
dard and Pennsylvania's extraordinary circumstances standard, how-
ever, is unclear. The Pennsylvania insurance commissioner interprets
122. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1799.7(b)(3) (1990).
123. The effective period of the rate freeze and rollback provisions expires on June 30,
1992. Pursuant to 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1799.7(e), after the rollbacks under subsection (b) no
insurer could increase private passenger auto rates between July 1, 1990 and June 30, 1991
(subject to the extraordinary circumstances relief provision of subsection (b)(3)). Between July
1, 1991 and June 30, 1992, rates may not be increased over those in effect pursuant to subsec-
tions (b) and (e) by amounts greater than the Consumer Price Index, the costs of medical
services, the cost of auto repairs or other indices approved by the Insurance Department. See
75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1799.7(f) (1990). Therefore, by its terms the rate rollback and freeze
expires June 30, 1992. Rate filings at that point will be subject to the Rate Act, 40 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 1181 (1947), and the Motor Vehicle Insurance Rate Review Procedures, 75 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 2001 (1990).
124. Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247, 1252-53 (Cal. 1989); accord
Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 693 P.2d 261 (Cal. 1984), affd. 475 U.S. 260 (1986), reh'g denied,
475 U.S. 1150 (1986); Birkenfeld v. Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001 (Cal. 1976) (superseded by
statute as stated in City of Santa Monica v. Yarmark, 203 Cal. App. 3d 153, 249 Cal. Rptr.
732 (2nd Dist 1988), modified, 203 Cal. App. 3d 895 (2nd Dist 1988)); Hutton Park Gardens
v. Town Council of West Orange, 350 A.2d I (N.J. 1975).
125. Calfarm, 771 P.2d 1247.
126. Id. at 1254. Confiscatory rates could be exacted in the automobile insurance line
while other divisions of the company were showing sufficient profits to keep the company sol-
vent and financially stable as a whole. Id.
127. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1799.7(b)(3) (1990).
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the extraordinary circumstances provision as authorizing whatever
relief the United States Constitution requires. This relief includes
allowing a fair rate of return and granting retroactive relief if neces-
sary. 128 However, employing the Calfarm rationale, the statute must
provide an adequate remedy against confiscatory rates on its face.'29
In reviewing the Pennsylvania law, the Nationwide court distin-
guished Calfarm on the basis that the California insolvency standard
was too stringent to guarantee a reasonable rate of return.' 30 There-
fore, as interpreted in Nationwide, the Pennsylvania law is facially
valid under the Federal Constitution. This holding, however, does
not foreclose inquiry into whether Pennsylvania's law will effect con-
fiscatory rates in practice,'3' or whether the law will be invalid under
a stricter interpretation of the Pennsylvania Constitution.' 32
b. "Temporary Taking" and the Possibility of Recoup-
ment.-The Commonwealth has asserted that any financial losses re-
sulting from the rate rollbacks are temporary because an insurer can
recover these losses in subsequent rate filings or through exemption
from the rollbacks.133 In Nationwide, the Commonwealth distin-
guished cases relied upon by the plaintiff by finding that in those
cases the regulated entity had no possibility of recouping losses re-
sulting from the regulation. 34 In contrast, the Pennsylvania law al-
128. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Foster, 739 F. Supp. 962, 964 (M.D. Pa. 1990). See
also Brief of Petitioner Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company and Nationwide Mutual Fire
Insurance Company, Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Insurance Dep't, No. 1719 C.D. (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1990) (brief filed in connection with Nationwide's appeal to the denial of exemption to the rate
rollbacks) [hereinafter "Brief of Petitioner in Nationwide"]. Nationwide agreed that a rate of
return below constitutional requirements would constitute extraordinary circumstances war-
ranting relief, but disagreed with the Commonwealth's method of computing target rates of
return. Id. at 61.
129. Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247, 1254 (Cal. 1989).
130. Nationwide, 739 F. Supp at 965.
131. In Keystone Ins. Co. v. Foster, 732 F. Supp. 36 (E.D. Pa. 1990), the court con-
strued § 1799.7(b)(3), the "constitutional safety valve," to afford adequate procedural protec-
tions, but stated that a rate setting record was lacking in the proceedings. Id. This statement
implies that if the relief provision'is consistently applied in a manner that does not protect
against confiscatory rates, an insurance company could overcome the statute's presumption of
constitutionality. See id.
132. See supra note 78.
133. See Brief of Commonwealth in Nationwide, supra note 112, at 23-26 (regarding
the initial five month freeze period) and 25-27 (regarding the full seventeen month application
of the Act).
134. Brief of Commonwealth in Nationwide, supra note 112, at 27. The Commonwealth
distinguished Prendergast v. New York Telephone Co., 262 U.S. 43 (1923) (enjoining rates set
by Public Service Commission of New York as being confiscatory even though the rates were
temporary and contingent upon a final review), on the basis that no possibility for recoupment
of losses existed. The Commonwealth also distinguished First English Evangelica Lutheran
Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1977), Banton v. Belt Line Railway Corp., 268 U.S.
413 (1925), and Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 270 U.S. 587 (1926). Brief of Common-
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lows for the possibility of recoupment.
Courts have generally upheld the constitutionality of temporary
rate reductions if the regulated entity can recoup losses in the final
ratemaking process.135 State rate regulations have been upheld as
constitutional even where a state does not provide a predeprivation
remedy if the statute contains mechanisms that provide a meaningful
review that comports with due process.' a Therefore, the validity of
state regulations that impose confiscatory rates seems to depend on
the existence of a procedure for later recoupment of losses. Nation-
wide recognized that the Pennsylvania insurance law affords a
postdeprivation remedy by providing sufficient opportunity for re-
coupment of losses through the extraordinary circumstances
provision."'7
Any losses suffered by insurance companies during the initial
freeze period 138 are permanent since the statute provides no proce-
dural relief from these losses.'" 9 Any losses sustained after July 1,
1990, however, are only temporary because the statute affords relief
for these losses."'4 Nationwide recognized the temporary nature of
any deprivations suffered during this latter period by holding that no
showing of irreparable injury existed since the statute provided safe-
guards against a permanent deprivation of constitutionally adequate
rates.""
wealth in Nationwide, supra note 112, at 27. The Commonwealth asserts that since Prender-
gast, the courts have upheld the constitutionality of rate regulations when the opportunity for
recoupment of losses exists in the final ratemaking process. Brief of Commonwealth in Nation-
wide, supra note 112, at 27. (citing Bronx Gas & Electric Co. v. Maltbie, 3 N.E. 2d 512
(N.Y. 1936); Beaver Valley Water Co. v. Driscoll, 28 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Pa. 1939); Smith v.
Department of Ins., 507 So.3d 1080 (Fla. 1987); and P.U.C. v. Pennsylvania Gas & Water
Co., 341 A.2d 239 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975), revd on other grounds, 424 A.2d 1213 (Pa.
1980)).
135. See, e.g., Whitney v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 963 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 813 (1986).
136. See Beaver Valley Co. v. Driscoll, 28 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Pa. 1939)(order of pub-
lic utility commission setting rates for water company upheld on basis that statute provided
possibility for recoupment and adequate postdeprivation remedy); accord Bronx Gas & Elec-
tric Co. v. Maltbie, 3 N.E.2d 512 (N.Y. 1936) (statute authorizing public service commission
to set temporary rates for electric service upheld since the statute provided adequate
postdeprivation remedy through the final rate proceeding). See also McKesson Corp. v. Divi-
sion of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1990) (state tax statute was found
unconstitutional; Due Process Clause required meaningful postpayment relief).
137. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1799.7(b)(3); Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Foster, 739 F.
Supp. 962, 964 (M.D. Pa. 1990).
138. 75 PA. CONS. STAr. § 1799.7(d) (1990).
139. See State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Insurance Dep't, 577 A.2d 951 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1990). See infra text discussion of the initial rate freeze period.
140. 75 PA CONS. STAT. § 1799.7(b)(3) (1990).
141. Nationwide, 739 F. Supp at 965. Further, retroactive ratemaking is allowable in
these circumstances, which permits recovery of profits on rates subsequently held insufficient.
Id. at 964. Although some courts have prohibited retroactive ratemaking, see e.g., Arkansas
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Under the extraordinary circumstances provision, insurance
companies can seek higher rates subject only to the requirements of
the Rate Act, which prohibits excessive, inadequate or discrimina-
tory rates.' 42 However, recoupment of past losses during subsequent
filing periods violates the Rate Act if the new rates are excessive and
discriminatory as to post-July 1, 1990 policyholders. Those policy-
holders should not be required to pay rates set on the basis of pre-
July 1, 1990 returns. This factor offsets the Commonwealth's asser-
tion that an adequate' postdeprivation remedy exists.
In appealing adverse decisions in federal district court, Keystone
and Nationwide argued that losses resulting from the freeze and
rollback measures were not merely temporary. 43 However, even if
considered temporary, rates that are only effective pending final de-
termination are not immune from judicial scrutiny. Confiscatory
rates effect a taking and trigger due process analysis, regardless of
the duration of the confiscation. 44 Therefore, the Rate Act can be
construed so as to prevent recoupment of past losses in subsequent
filing periods regardless of the nature or duration of the losses.
3. Substantive Due Process: Rational Relation To a Legiti-
mate Governmental Objective.-Beyond the procedural aspects of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Constitution limits state legisla-
tures' authority to regulate substantive economic rights. The Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right to be free from
state regulation that is discriminatory or arbitrary."' Thus, to with-
stand scrutiny, the state regulations must be rationally related to the
achievement of a legitimate state objective."' Unless a state statute
violates the Federal Constitution, courts cannot override the policies
of state legislatures in enacting regulatory measures in that states
have authority to adopt any reasonable measures thought to promote
public welfare.'
47
Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571 (1981); Southern California Edison Co. v. F.E.R.C.,
805 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir. 1986), such prohibition is generally statutory.
142. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1183(d) (1947).
143. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 65, at 20-25.
144. See Prendergast v. New York Telephone Co., 262 U.S. 43 (1923) (enjoining rates
set by the Public Service Commission of New York as being confiscatory even though the rates
were temporary and contingent upon a final review). See also Brief of Amici Curiae, supra
note 65.
145. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) (New York regulatory scheme
that set milk prices held rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective.).
146. Id.
147. Id.
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In light of the automobile insurance crisis in Pennsylvania,148 it
is clear that the Pennsylvania Legislature had a legitimate objective
in seeking to reduce rates and generally improve: the automobile in-
surance system. 4 9 Consequently, a strong presumption of constitu-
tionality accompanies the Financial Responsibility Law of 1990, and
it will be upheld absent a clear showing of a constitutional viola-
tion. 5' The Financial Responsibility Law is constitutional under
substantive due process if the insurance premium rollback measure is
rationally related to cost savings for Pennsylvania motorists.
Insurance companies assert that the rate rollback provisions are
arbitrary and discriminatory both facially and as applied to individ-
ual policy holders. For example, Nationwide argued that the rate
rollbacks are inequitable because the imposition of bottom-line pre-
mium reductions of 10% and 22% is not reflective of varying policy
coverages.' Nationwide also asserted that the rate rollbacks are not
rationally related to overall expected savings because the Act was
not based on any meaningful cost studies or assessments of the po-
tential effects on insurance companies. 52
148. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
149. See Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Insurance Dep't, 585 A.2d 1160 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1991). In rejecting the plaintiffs' equal protection challenge, the court held that the Legisla-
ture could have rationally determined that across-the-board premium reductions were war-
ranted in light of the benefits insurers received in exchange for the reductions. Id. at 1165. The
court cited "quid pro quo" for rate reductions other provisions of Act 6, such as the limited
tort option, anti-fraud provisions, "double-dipping" provisions, and the cap on medical benefits.
Id. at 1165 n.7. See also Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 S.2d 1080 (Fla. 1987) (holding
that Florida had a legitimate interest in regulating rates charged by insurance companies);
accord Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247 (Cal. 1989).
150. Keystone Ins. Co. v. Foster, 732 F. Supp. 36, 38 (E.D. Pa. 1990); see also Kirk v.
Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 425 A.2d 1188 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981) (Penn-
sylvania unemployment compensation statute denying benefits to claimants who were self-em-
ployed does not violate equal protection; plaintiff failed to overcome statute's strong presump-
tion of validity.).
151. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 65, at 32-34. Nationwide argues that the reduc-
tions apply across the board without a logical relation to cost savings. Nationwide asserts that
the rollbacks do not reflect varying levels of property damage compensation, collision, road
service and other optional coverages. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 65, at 32-34. "If pre-
mium reductions were rationally related to cost savings, they would follow logically and con-
sistently from the insurer's lower costs, and would be the same for similarly situated policy-
holders. Rate reductions for affected coverages would not vary without regard to the risks
assumed by the insurer." Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 65, at 33. But see Ohio Casualty
Ins. Co. v. Insurance Dep't, 585 A.2d 1160, 1165 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991), holding that for
purposes of equal protection analysis, across-the-board premium reductions were warranted
considering the benefits insurers received in exchange for the reductions.
152. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 65, at 35-38. Citing the House debate on H.B.
121 (otherwise known as Act 6) Nationwide points out that the Commonwealth conducted no
meaningful cost studies in arriving at the ten and twenty-two percent rollbacks. Id. at 36
(citing debate, Legislative Journal-House, at 2149, Dec. 12, 1989). The Act does, however,
include a provision empowering the Insurance Department to conduct market studies on the
effect of rates on insurance companies and their insureds. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1799.5 (1990).
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The actuarial proficiency of the rate rollbacks and the extent to
which the motor vehicle insurance law will result in real cost savings
present some doubts. However, given the deferential nature of sub-
stantive due process analysis, the Commonwealth's means are ration-
ally related to achieving the goal of providing more affordable auto-
mobile insurance premiums.' 5 3 The Commonwealth asserts that
although it could have validly chosen more restrictive measures to
lower insurance premiums, the legislature adopted the scheme em-
ployed by Act 6 in order to accommodate the interest of insurance
companies and the public. 54 Insurance companies have no constitu-
tional right to maximum profits, only a right to a fair rate of re-
turn.1 55 In view of the traditional understanding that a state in its
regulatory capacity may set rates in order to advance the public wel-
fare,15 the Financial Responsibility Law meets substantive due pro-
cess standards.
57
V. Practical Considerations For Relief From Confiscatory Rates
A. California Precedent
At the time the Pennsylvania legislature passed the Financial
Responsibility Law of 1990, the defects in California's automobile
insurance rate reform statute should have been apparent.158 Al-
though clearly not binding on Pennsylvania courts, Calfarm's due
process analysis stated that in determining whether a statute satisfies
the due process guarantee of a fair rate of return, courts are primar-
ily concerned with whether the rates ultimately set are confisca-
tory. ' 59 To successfully challenge a regulatory statute on due process
Again, however, Ohio Casualty, 585 A.2d at 1165, held in the context of equal protection
analysis that, "Legislation need not mathematically preise to withstand rational relationship
scrutiny."
153. See Parker v. Department of Labor & Indus., 540 A.2d 313 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1988), affd, 557 A.2d 1061 (Pa. 1989) (upholding the constitutionality of a statute denying
unemployment compensation for the off-season to seasonal workers who had a reasonable as-
surance of work for the next season).
154. Brief of Commonwealth in Nationwide, supra note 112, at 34-36.
155. See Massachusetts Bonding Co. v. Commissioner, 107 N.E.2d 807 (Mass. 1952).
156. Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989).
157. Ohio Casualty held that although insurers have a right to a non-confiscatory, fair
and adequate rate of return, they have no property right in continuing to charge the same
rates they had been charging. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Insurance Dep't, 585 A.2d 1160, 1165
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
158. See Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247 (Cal. 1989), which held that
the rate rollback provisions of Proposition 103 violated the Due Process Clause. Calfarm was
decided before the new Pennsylvania insurance law was enacted.
159. Calfarm, 771 P.2d at 1252. Courts are less concerned with the manner in which
rates are set. Id.; accord Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 693 P.2d 261 (Cal. 1984), aff'd, 475 U.S.
260 (1986), reh'g denied, 475 U.S. 1150 (1986); Birkenfeld v. Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001 (Cal.
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grounds, the regulated entity must show that the statute facially pre-
cludes a fair rate of return and fails to expressly provide adequate
means to avoid confiscatory results.' 0 The Pennsylvania law con-
tained the same flaw as Proposition 103 with regard to the initial
freeze period" 1 because it precluded the insurance commissioner
from granting relief from confiscatory results.'62
In considering the full application of the Act and the rollbacks
effective after July 1, 1990, the Pennsylvania legislature should have
more carefully examined California's Proposition 103. The commis-
sioner has interpreted the extraordinary circumstances provision as a
constitutional safety valve authorizing relief in whatever form re-
quired by the Constitution." 3 Therefore, on its face, the statute
meets the Calfarmn standard since relief from confiscatory rates is
obtainable through the procedural mechanisms. of review. 64 The
only remaining issue is whether the Motor Vehicle Financial Re-
sponsibility Law of 1990 will guarantee constitutionally adequate
rates in practice.
B. Pennsylvania's Procedural Relief Provisions in Practice
Standing alone, the Pennsylvania law's procedural relief mecha-
nism"' provides adequate assurance of a fair rate of return. This
provision affords a postdeprivation remedy and an opportunity for
recouping losses potentially incurred because of confiscatory rates.
The question becomes, however, whether this is a "meaningful"
postdeprivation remedy that provides "adequate" opportunity to
recoup losses and obtain a fair rate of return.
1. What Is a Fair Rate of Return?-It is clear that insurance
companies are not constitutionally entitled to the maximum rate of
1976), superseded by statute as stated in City of Santa Monica v. Yarmark, 203 Cal. App. 3d
153, 249 Cal. Rptr. 732 (2nd Dist. 1988), modified, 203 Cal. App. 3d 895 (2nd Dist. 1988);
Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council of West Orange, 350 A.2d I (N.J. 1975).
160. Calfarm, 771 P.2d at 1252. The court found two cases in which facial challenges to
a regulatory statute were upheld, but distinguished these cases on their facts. See Mora v.
Mejias, 223 F.2d 814 (Ist Cir. 1955) (price controls in Puerto Rico); Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 263 N.E.2d 698 (Mass. 1970) (Massachusetts auto insur-
ance rates schedule).
161. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1799.7(d) (1990). See supra notes 94-111 and accompanying
text for discussion of the initial rate freeze period.
162. See State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Insurance Dep't, 577 A.2d 951 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1990).
163. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Foster, 739 F. Supp. 962, 964 (M.D. Pa. 1990).
164. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1799(b)(3) (1990).
165. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1799.7(b)(3) (1990).
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return on their investments.'66 In addition, the Commonwealth as-
serts that insurers have no vested right in maintaining the status
quo. ' 7 Any company is deprived of premium income if it is limited
in the rates it can charge, but this does not constitute a deprivation
of the right to a fair rate of return. All that is constitutionally re-
quired is a "fair rate of return" in light of the risks.'
6 8
Insurance companies dispute the Commonwealth's computations
regarding what constitutes a fair rate of return. 6 9 The courts have
not resolved this specific issue. However, in holding that insurance
companies must use the relief provisions contained in the insurance
law itself, courts have expressed a willingness to defer such determi-
nations to the Insurance Department.7
The courts, as well as the Pennsylvania Legislature, have taken
official notice of past insurance industry profits in defining a fair rate
of return. Therefore, although it has not been given a precise defini-
tion, the Financial Responsibility Law of 1990 does not facially pre-
clude a "fair rate of return." The extraordinary circumstances provi-
sion reflects the central importance of individualized determinations.
Since the courts are willing to accept the Insurance Department's
target rate of return, "' the Insurance Department's role is to bal-
ance the relevant factors in each case to assure fair and adequate
rates of return.
1 7 2
166. See Massachusetts Bonding Co. v. Commissioner, 107 N.E.2d 807 (Mass. 1952).
167. Brief of Commonwealth in Nationwide, supra note 112, at 19. Ohio Casualty held
that insurers have no property right in continuing to charge rates they had been charging.
Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ins. Dep't, 585 A.2d 1160 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
168. Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989); accord Keystone Water Co.
v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n, 339 A.2d 873 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975), af'd, 385
A.2d 946 (Pa. 1978).
169. Brief of Petitioner in Nationwide, supra note 128, at 61-65. Nationwide, for exam-
ple, disputes the Insurance Department's use of a 12% target rate of return based on statutory
surplus (or 10% based on generally accepted accounting principles), which was computed on a
10-year statistical average rate of return achieved across the nation by property and casualty
insurers. Nationwide also asserted that the target rate ignores inflationary factors and that the
Commonwealth should not have based its computations on returns within the insurance indus-
try itself since past regulation has produced a total return far below what should be considered
reasonable. Brief of Petitioner in Nationwide, supra note 128, at 61-65.
170. See, e.g., Keystone Ins. Co. v. Foster, 732 F. Supp. 36 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding
that determination of extraordinary circumstances must originate with the Insurance Depart-
ment); Ohio Casualty, 585 A.2d 1160 (holding that compliance with rate filing and extraordi-
nary circumstances provision is a prerequisite to obtaining relief from rate rollbacks).
The court in Ohio Casualty refused to accept the assertion that because pre-Act 6 insur-
ance premiums were not determined to have been "excessive", insurance companies were re-
ceiving the bare minimum of what could be considered a fair and adequate rate of return
before the rollbacks, such that post-Act 6 premiums should be considered excessive. Ohio Cas-
ualty, 585 A.2d at 1165.
171. See supra note 169.
172. This role will continue after expiration of the rate freeze and rollback measures.
See supra note 123.
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2. Limitations of the Rate Act.-Practical considerations may
undermine the procedural relief provided by the Financial Responsi-
bility Law of 1990. First, as indicated in State Farm, the Rate Act
may preclude recoupment of past losses in subsequent filing periods
if revised rates are excessive.17 Present policyholders should not be
forced to pay premiums that reflect past underwriting losses or fail-
ures to attain expected profits. Second, the recoupment analysis
could be considered flawed because most cases upholding rate roll-
backs involve public utility regulation. 74 Regulation of the insurance
industry is arguably distinguishable from public utility regulation
because insurers must operate in a free market without assurance
that drivers will renew their policies, whereas public utilities are as-
sured a relatively constant pool of customers. 75 Thus, a deprivation
of a fair rate of return for any duration results in a competitive dis-
advantage and permanent loss of profits not recoverable in subse-
quent proceedings.
Although insurance companies are certainly in a different mar-
ket situation than public utilities, it is difficult to see how mandatory
rate rollbacks will result in a competitive disadvantage since any in-
surance regulation must affect all companies equally. In addition, all
motorists must demonstrate financial responsibility as a prerequisite
to driving. For most drivers this means purchasing insurance. 17' Be-
cause motorists must purchase some type of coverage, no loss of
competitiveness results as long as the rate rollbacks are universal.
The Rate Act and the insurance law, however, could operate as
a catch 22 for insurers. Recoupment of losses resulting from confis-
catory rates is theoretically available through the postdeprivation
remedy provided in the relief provision,' 77 or through seeking higher
rates during the next filing period after the expiration of the rate
freeze and rollback provisions. The Rate Act, however, may prevent
this result.1 78 Although State Farm only addressed the constitution-
173. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Insurance Dep't, 577 A.2d 951, 953-54 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1990).
174. See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 65, at 23-24.
175. See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 65, at 23-24.
176. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1005 and 1306 (1990) (relating to self-certification of
financial responsibility) and § 1786 (requiring financial responsibility).
177. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1799.7(b)(3) (1990).
178. See supra notes 133-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of temporary tak-
ings and the possibility of recoupment. See also Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 65, at 24.
The first area of potential conflict between the insurance law and tOe Rate Act was dismissed
by Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Insurance Dep't, 585 A.2d 1160 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991). Section
3(d) of the Rate Act, 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1183(d) (1947), suggests that rates which are not
excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory cannot be altered. Ohio Casualty held that §
1799.7 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act of 1990 supersedes that section of
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ality of the rate freeze between December 1, 1989 and July 1, 1990,
its discussion of the interplay between the insurance law and the
Rate Act is equally applicable to rates after the initial freeze period.
The court stated:
If the Commissioner were to authorize an increase in premiums
under the extraordinary circumstances provision so that State
Farm could recoup from new policyholders losses it sustained
when the rollback was applied to its previous policyholders those
rates would be clearly excessive as to the new policyholders and
thus violative of the Rate Act.179
State Farm suggests that premiums which reflect factors other
than the particularities of the insurance risks and the policy features
of the class of insureds within a specific filing period, are excessive
under the Rate Act. A timely postdeprivation remedy, which would
permit retroactive relief within the same period and under the same
general underwritings as the losses occurred, will survive scrutiny
under the Rate Act. Losses would be recouped from the same policy-
holders whose lower rates had resulted in the confiscatory losses.
However, exacting higher rates in subsequent filing periods from pol-
icyholders who did not necessarily benefit from the previously confis-
catory rates does not comport with the Rate Act.
The Commonwealth's recoupment analysis is flawed under the
Rate Act because previous losses cannot be passed on to subsequent
policyholders in the next filing period. 180 Therefore, the only remedy
for recovering confiscatory losses is the extraordinary circumstances
provision. The Commonwealth must assure that any relief under the
extraordinary circumstances provision occurs within the filing period
that encompassed the confiscatory rates. After expiration of the
rollback and freeze measures, relief must be assured under the In-
surance Department's rate review procedures consistent with the
Rate Act.' In either case, this analysis depends on the Common-
wealth's method of computing rates and its concept of a "fair rate of
return."' 82 In practice, this process may well lead to litigation over
what constitutes a fair rate of return and possible due process
the Rate Act to the extent that it states that such rates cannot be changed. Id. at 1165 n.6.
179. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Insurance Dep't, 577 A.2d 951, 954 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1990).
180. See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 65, at 23-25.
181. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2001 (1990); see also supra note 123.
182. See supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of fair rate of
return.
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challenges."' 3
VII. Conclusion
The Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law
of 1990 is not free from ambiguity and questions of constitutionality.
The sense of urgency with which the legislature passed the law and
the inherent need for compromise between competing interests are
clearly the causes of these infirmities. 84 Questions about the Act's
ultimate cost savings will persist long after the constitutional ques-
tions are resolved.
The constitutionality of the rate rollbacks under procedural due
process analysis is the primary question raised by the Pennsylvania
motor vehicle insurance law. Pennsylvania should have scrutinized
more closely California precedent in tailoring prccedural safeguards
against confiscatory results. Insurance companies are guaranteed a
fair rate of return on their investments. The initial rate freeze (De-
cember 1, 1989 to July 1, 1990) did not provide adequate protection
of this right. The subsequent freeze and rollback period (July 1,
1990 to June 30, 1991) provides protection on the face of the law,
but it may encounter due process obstacles in application.
The extraordinary circumstances provision is necessarily the fo-
cus of constitutional analysis. This provision must strike a delicate
balance between the mandates of the Rate Act and the constitu-
tional due process guarantee of a fair rate of return on investment.
Only timely application of the extraordinary circumstances provision
will afford a constitutionally adequate postdeprivation remedy by al-
lowing the recoupment of confiscatory losses during the filing period
within which such losses occurred. Recoupment of past losses in sub-
sequent filing periods is not permissible under the Rate Act.
Emergency situations may call for emergency measures, but the
problem of chronically escalating insurance rates is not a short-term
183. The Calfarm analysis would invalidate the statute if it neither facially or in prac-
tice guarantees fair rates of return for insurance companies. See Calfarm Ins. Co. v.
Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247, 1252-53 (Cal. 1989). See also supra notes 18-32 and accompa-
nying text. This result is unlikely in light of the Insurance Department's position that the
extraordinary circumstances provision will operate to afford all constitutionally mandated re-
lief. However, the disparity between the Insurance Department and insurance companies in
interpretation of the fair rate of return concept seems to invite litigation.
184. Nationwide, State Farm and Allstate claim that the new insurance law is merely a
politically expedient measure to subsidize consumers. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 65, at
29-30 (citing Bello V. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 851
(1988) and 488 U.S. 868 (1988); Mora v. Mejias, 223 F.2d 814 Ist Cir. 1955). They assert
that action taken for political reasons can have no legitimate governmental objective. Brief of
Amici Curiae, supra note 65, at 29-30.
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crisis. 185 The insurance problem "is a long term, chronic situation
which will not be solved by compelling insurers to sell at less than a
fair rate of return for a year."18 Profits accumulated in the past do
not justify the use of confiscatory rates to decrease insurance premi-
ums in the future.' 87 Thus, the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Finan-
cial Responsibility Law of 1990 should be viewed in a larger context
to determine its cost effectiveness in the future.
Under substantive due process analysis, the law should encoun-
ter no further challenges. The statute's goal and the path chosen by
the Pennsylvania Legislature to effectuate that goal are sufficiently
related to satisfy the Due Process Clause. Rate rollbacks of 10%
and 22 % may not be the best nor the only possible means of control-
ling escalating insurance rates, but the Act satisfies the deferential
substantive due process standard. The Legislature could rationally
believe that insurance premiums will be permanently reduced. As
the court stated in Nationwide, in regard to substantive due process
analysis under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, "We were
left unconvinced that the Commonwealth was incorrect about cost
savings which would justify premium reductions such as those aris-
ing from different insurance coverages or a reduction in first party
benefit claims."' 88
The cost savings measures of the new law, particularly the tort
coverage options, are premised on the belief that the insurance crisis
was caused primarily by a proliferation of lawsuits seeking too much
money.' 89 Studies as to how the rate rollbacks will ultimately relate
to actual cost savings are lacking. 90 The Commonwealth, however,
asserts that a clear relationship between cost savings and the pre-
mium reductions exist.19' This relationship is sufficient to satisfy sub-
stantive due process analysis, but in practice the absence of a sound
statistical basis may foretell complications in the future.
As with the No-Fault Act and the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle
185. Calfarm, 771 P.2d at 1255 (citing Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council of West
Orange, 350 A.2d I (N.J. 1975)).
186. Id.
187. Board of Public Utility Comm'rs v. New York Telephone Co., 271 U.S. 23, 31-32
(1926).
188. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Foster, 739 F. Supp. 962, 965 (M.D. Pa. 1990).
189. Joan C. McKenna, New Pennsylvania Car Insurance Law Attacked As Unconstitu-
tional, PA. L.J. REP., Feb. 12, 1990, at 3.
190. See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 65, at 36 (citing legislative debate that
stated no studies were conducted to justify the proposed rollbacks). But see Brief of Common-
wealth in Nationwide, supra note 112, at 36 (in which the state asserts that the rational basis
standard does not mean a statute must institute rates with exact actuarial proficiency).
191. Brief of Commonwealth in Nationwide, supra note 112, at 36.
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Financial Responsibility Law of 1984 before it, the new Pennsylva-
nia automobile insurance law places the courts in a position of
resolving issues the Legislature could not resolve. The courts are not
ideally situated to carry this burden. 192 Thus, the courts have shifted
primary responsibility back to the Insurance Department to interpret
"fair rate of return" and guarantee adequate rates. This deference
will continue unless the considerations outlined above in practice in-
terfere with insurance companies' rights to obtain a fair rate of re-
turn on investments.
The Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law
of 199019 will serve as a valuable model for rate regulation in the
future in the insurance industry and other fields. It is clear that leg-
islatures must carefully tailor procedural safeguards to prevent un-
constitutional takings of private property. Additionally, state courts
may interpret state constitutional due process guarantees as a
broader source of private property rights.19
The controversy over the rate freeze and rollbacks has subsided,
perhaps because Act 6 actually resulted in cost savings. 195 More em-
pirical data is needed before the full effects on insurance companies
and their insureds can be adequately determined. When insurance
companies file for new rates after June 30, 1992 (when the freeze
and rollback measures expire) the controversy over auto insurance
rates is likely to flare up again since insurers will inevitably seek rate
hikes. Responsibility will remain with the Insurance Department to
ensure companies a "fair rate of return" while preventing a regres-
sion to pre-Act 6 automobile insurance rates.
T. Andrew Lingle
192. Certain complications have already arisen. Some insurers threatened to pull out of
the Pennsylvania auto insurance market. See supra notes 27, 61-62. Other insurers simply
refuse to write new policies in certain geographical areas. See Consumer Group Slams Six
Pennsylvania Auto Companies, NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, Jan. ., 1990, at 21. Pennsylvania
Citizens Action charged State Farm, Allstate, Erie, Aetna, Keystone and Nationwide with
11redlining" - denying thousands of motorists insurance coverage. Id. These problems can be
expected to continue until the courts or the legislature resolve the constitutional uncertainties
surrounding the Financial Responsibility Law.
193. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. 1701 (1990).
194. See United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, No. 48 E.D. Ap-
peal Docket 1990, 7/10/91, reh'g granted, 9/4/91 (1991 WL 128352). See supra note 78.
195. Insurance Department sources indicate that insurers are no longer pursuing consti-
tutional challenge to the rate freeze and rollback provisions. This may be because their profits
have actually risen due to the new rate scheme. Interview with Insurance Department staff
attorney (Jan. 28, 1990). Thus it is the Insurance Department's position that the Motor Vehi-
cle Financial Responsibility Law of 1990 has produced cost savings for insurers and overall
lower premiums for insureds. Id.
